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ABSTRAK  
 
Kajian empirikal membuktikan bahawa terdapat hubungan antara pembolehubah tadbir urus 
korporat dan kos ekuiti. Kesan tadbir urus korporat ke atas kos ekuiti adalah sangat penting 
kepada firma dan juga kepada pelabur kerana mereka akan mendapat maklumat dan 
gambaran yang lebih baik mengenai keadaan firma mereka dan juga bagaimana pelaburan 
mereka diuruskan. Kajian lepas menjelaskan dengan adanya tadbir urus korporat yang baik, 
maka ia dapat mengurangkan kos ekuiti dan dengan itu secara tidak langsung ia 
meningkatkan keyakinan pelabur dan jumlah saham yang didagangkan. Tujuan kertas ini 
adalah untuk mengkaji hubungan antara pembolehubah tadbir urus korporat (pemboleh ubah 
terdiri daripada saiz lembaga, tahap pengarah bebas, fungsi dualiti Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif 
dan pelaburan daripada institusi) dengan kos ekuiti di Malaysia. Analisis dijalankan ke atas 
978 buah firma (2,881 firma dalam tahun pemerhatian) yang tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia 
meliputi tahun 1999 hingga 2009. Hasil ujian regresi menunjukkan terdapat hubungan 
signifikan antara tadbir urus korporat dan kos ekuiti terutamanya bagi factor pelabur institusi. 
Hasil kajian ini juga menunjukkan bahawa firma akan memperolehi manfaat dari tadbir urus 
korporat yang digunapakai dalam bentuk pengurangan kos ekuiti dan seterusnya dapat 
membantu perkembangan pasaran modal dan pengagihan sumber dengan lebih efisien. 
 
x 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The empirical study proves that there is a relationship between corporate governance 
variables and cost of equity. The impact of corporate governance to the cost of equity is very 
important to the firms and also to the investors because they will get better information about 
how well their company or their investment is managed. The past studies explained that, with 
good corporate governance, it can reduce the cost of equity, and thus indirectly enhance 
investors’ confidence and the number of shares traded. The purpose of this paper is to 
examine the relationship between corporate governance variables (board size, level of 
independent director, CEO duality and institutional investor) and cost of equity in Malaysia. 
Analyses are conducted on 978 firms (2881 firm-year observations) listed on Bursa Malaysia 
from 1999 to 2009. Regression test results show that there is a significant relationship 
between corporate governance and cost of equity only for institutional investor variables. The 
study also shows that firms are expected to benefit from corporate governance adopted in the 
form of reduced cost of equity, and thus it can help the development of capital markets and 
the allocation of resources becomes more efficient. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
This first chapter introduces the research outline of the study. The flow of this chapter 
begins with Section 1.2 by highlighting the background of this study and Section 1.3 the 
problem statement followed by Section 1.4 research questions, Section 1.5 research 
objectives and Section 1.6  is discussing about the significance of the study. Finally, in 
Section 1.7 is a brief of the overview for the remaining chapters in the study.  
 
1.2 Background of the Study                  
 
In order to begin this research, it is important to know the overview of the research itself. 
In today’s public corporations, investors and owners do not have total control in spending 
their money and are not distracted in the process of making decisions. The owners 
relinquish the control to professional controllers or managers to impose greater control 
over the resources of a firm. Fundamentally, the ownership of public companies is 
detached from control. Berle and Means, (1932) define this as leading to conflicts of 
interest between managers and owners. These conflicts of interest occur when the 
managers are directly involved in the activities that are inconsistent with the goals of 
maximizing shareholders’ wealth. With the widespread conflicts of interest, it eventually 
results in minimizing the value of the firm. 
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From these conflicts of interest, ideas form the starting point for research in corporate 
governance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe in their famous theory of the firm 
paper, applied agency theory to the contemporary corporation and formally modelled the 
agency costs of equity. The owners and shareholders need to set up corporate governance 
to reduce agency’s costs evolve from opportunistic behaviour of management and for 
reducing the adverse effects of an incomplete contacting. 
 
Ibrahim and Abdul Samad (2008), explain the word 'governance' is synonymous with 
economic organisations and corporations for several decades. With this term being used 
for a long time and it is extremely important and beneficial to the success of business 
organisations, at the same time it is also giving good returns for investors. Corporate 
governance has been explained and there are several control methods such as the 
structure of the board, managers and boards' incentive compensation, the right decision 
of the board of directors and chief executive officer, replacing the board of directors and 
chief executive officer, the voting shareholders, debt/equity finance, exposure on the 
acquisition and others. Therefore, corporate governance can be considered as a set of 
how effective the institutions are in managing and making corporate decisions (Ball, 
1998). 
 
In order to minimize the agency costs, corporate governance covers a wide range of 
internal and external mechanisms. This in hand, increase the monitoring management 
action, restricting opportunistic conduct of managers and improve the quality of firm 
information flows in the framework of the detachment of ownership and control. No 
matter how the significance of corporate governance in public companies is widely 
known, its role in creating value for our shareholders remains distinct. This is generally 
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normal for the market and the performance of accounting firms. However, there is a 
brand new show idea in which the firm can also be stand view from the point of the 
firm's capabilities. Thus it would benefit from a reduced cost of capital (the cost of equity 
and debt) from an outcome of strong corporate governance mechanisms (Donker and 
Zahir, 2008).  
 
The problems of current economic conditions affect more companies around the world. 
Improper corporate governance is said to be the root of the problem. Abdul Wahab et al. 
(2007) describe that in 1997/98, Asian financial crisis has shown that improper corporate 
governance practices in Malaysia has added to the company’s downfall. In 2004, the 
World Bank (Klapper et al., 2004) carries out a research on corporate governance, 
investor protection, and performance in budding markets. Klapper et al. (2004) find that 
good governance is associated to the operational performance, measured in return on 
assets, and market valuation, as measured in the price to book ratio, while those greater 
correlations strong in countries where legal systems are weak.  
 
Problems occurs between shareholders and managers that expose the agency costs of 
shareholders created by the separation of ownership and control in corporate 
organisations due to the imbalance of information. Agency costs arise when managers 
have their own personal interests at the expense of shareholders, the information 
asymmetry that will create moral hazard problems. When investors cannot distinguish the 
true economic value of the firm that is partially a function of the indistinguishable quality 
of management, so the agency costs will arise. Lack of transparency in decision and risk 
exposure of financial information in a higher information are imposed on shareholders. 
Without effective monitoring, transparency of financial information and adequate 
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control, rational investors will price-protect against expected agency costs, effectively 
increase the cost of equity capital firms.  
 
Chen et al. (2009) state that the correlation between corporate governance and the cost of 
equity capital using data from 559 firm-year observations across the 17 rising markets are 
covered in two corporate governance surveys by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia 
(CLSA).  Chen et al. (2009) find a significantly negative relation between a firm’s 
corporate governance and its cost of equity capital after controlling for risk factors, 
especially among firms in countries with relatively weak shareholder protection.  
 
Corporate governance is a set of system through which external investors can guard 
themselves against threat by insiders as defined by La Porta et al. (2000). The cost of 
equity of a firm can be reduced using these sets of mechanisms. This is because better 
corporate governance offers lower price of equity by minimizing the cost of external 
supervising by external investors (Chen et al, 2009).  
 
According to Lombardo and Pagano (2002), as they need to spend more time and 
resources on monitoring the firms’ managers, outside investors demand a higher required 
rate of return from firms with poor corporate governance. In addition, corporate 
governance also lowers the cost of equity by putting limitations for opportunist insiders 
and thus reducing information asymmetry. In Southeast Asia, better corporate 
governance is associated with less insider trading (Hung and Trezevant, 2003). 
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Ashbaugh et al. (2004) find that the governance ascribes considerably concerning the 
firm’s cost of equity capital directly. Hence, the objective of this paper is to investigate 
the area to which corporate governance attributes that are intended to reduce agency 
problems affect firms’ cost of equity capital. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that the effect of corporate governance on firm value 
has a large research interest. There are too many researchers in the field of accounting 
and finance. It is argued that if a firm entered into a robust governance mechanism, they 
must be well managed and profitable. Indeed, strong corporate governance is expected to 
contribute in the overall value creation process. 
 
An upsurge of literature justifies that corporate governance mechanisms such as 
independent directors, the quality of information disclosure, ownership structure, audit 
committees and institutional shareholders are able to contribute towards enhancing the 
performance of the firm [Abdullah (2004); Drobetz et al. (2004); Black et al., (2006); 
Brown and Caylor (2006); and Bauer et al., (2008)].  
 
Apart from market and accounting performance measures of firms, the cost of capital, 
which consists of  cost of equity and debt, is primarily a measure of risk. It is also closely 
linked with the firm and is often regarded as a key determinant of value. Donker and 
Zahir (2008) state broadly that sound corporate governance has a positive influence on 
the cost of capital (the cost of equity and debt). Similarly, the mechanism of strong 
corporate governance will provide a low risk to the firm as well as low cost of capital. In 
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the suit it would raise the market value of the firm, a value that will result when the firm 
can benefit from an economical source of capital. Moreover, the cost of capital (consist 
of cost of debt and cost of equity) is significant for firms to evaluate future investment 
opportunities and review existing investments. 
 
Many researchers find that better corporate governance quality is able to improve the 
firm’s access to equity finance thereby reduces a firm’s cost of equity capital. Claessens 
(2003) and La Porta et al. (2000), also support that better corporate governance enable 
the firms to reduce their cost of equity. This may be because the outside might be 
providing extensive financial and expect a lower rate of return if they are guaranteed a 
larger return from their investment.  
 
The stipulation of poor corporate governance affects agency costs to firms in the form of 
investment as incompetent and it is also to some certain limit will affect the funding 
decision as presented by Gompers et al. (2003). Singh (2003) also argues that firms 
which are more competent and dynamic access the capital from the stock market at low 
cost, while the firms with less capability and vitality will have to raise capital at higher 
costs. 
 
Previous literature finds consistent evidence around the world that good corporate 
governance is associated with higher firm valuation to study the United States (U.S.) (see 
Gompers et al., (2003) and Aggarwal et al. (2005, 2007) for international studies). 
However, it is not clear why the firm has any interest assessment of good governance 
practices. It can either be caused by the firm with better governance practice generates 
higher cash flows to shareholders or they have contacts to external financing at lower 
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costs that discounts future cash flow less heavily. Hail and Leuz (2006) find that firms 
from countries with greater disclosure requirements, regulations and high safety of law 
enforcement have a much lower cost of equity capital. Yavuz (2008) finds investor 
protection to prevent redistribution of wealth by the management and reduce costs related 
to the systematic risk of equity. 
 
Cost of equity is the minimum rate of return that a business or organization must offer 
investors or owners to offset their wait for a return on investment and for assuming some 
level of risk. Cost of equity is one of the item under company's capital structure, and 
mostly depends on many factors such as firm performance, financial factors and 
economic conditions, the board of independent directors, board size, and government 
policies and regulations. As an investor in the company chosen by the public always has 
the option to quit taking the decision to sell its shares. With this way, the rules governing 
the attitude of the business considerations of the court on the separation of management 
and financing is to keep the courts out of corporate decisions except on matters of 
executive pay, self-dealing and protection of share of the spoils by (Titman et al., 2010). 
 
The factors of internal and external characteristics of corporate governance in this study 
are to be discovered on how much it will affect the outcome for the cost of equity. Gupta 
et al. (2010) in his study previously find that the origin of law, financial development and 
the development and characteristics of firm level governance has affected the cost of 
equity capital. Another research done by Chen et al. (2009) find that the level of 
corporate governance firms have a large negative impact on the cost of equity capital, 
especially in countries that provide legal protection for investors is relatively weak. They 
also concluded that the effects of a strong complementary between firm-level governance 
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practices and the protection and disclosure laws at the state level in terms of reducing the 
cost of equity. 
 
This study will examine internal and external factors of corporate governance that 
influence the outcome of the cost of equity. Thus, the problem statement for this study is 
to examine the correlations between corporate governance factors and cost of equity. 
 
1.4 Research Questions   
 
With accordance to the purpose, this study will proceed to answer the following 
questions: 
(a) What is the relationship between Corporate Governance and Cost of Equity? 
(b) What is the effect of internal Corporate Governance to the Cost of Equity? 
(c) What is the effect of external Corporate Governance to the Cost of Equity? 
 
1.5 Research Objectives 
 
Based on the research problems, the main objective of this study is to: 
(a) To investigate the relationship of board size with firms’ cost of equity. 
(b) To examine the relationship of independent directors of the firm with the cost of 
equity. 
(c) To investigate the relationship between CEO duality with firms’ cost of equity. 
(d) To investigate the connection of institutional investor with the cost of equity of 
the public listed firms. 
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1.6 Definition of Key Terms  
 
In order to better understanding of the concepts, the following key terms’ definition are 
referred specifically. 
 
(a) Cost of equity 
Cost of equity is normally used to measure on the returns that the stock market 
demands for investors. Cost of equity is the required rate of return that a 
stockholder demands from a publicly-traded company in exchange for buying a 
share and assuming the risk associated with it (Zorn, 2007). Cost of equity is also 
include under company's capital structure along with preferred stock, common 
stock, and cost of debt.  
 
(b) Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance refers to the structures and processes for the direction and 
control of companies. Corporate governance concerns the relationships among the 
management, board of directors, controlling shareholders, minority shareholders 
and other stakeholders (Corporate Governance Survey Report, 2006). 
 
(c) Board size 
Board size refers to total number of director on board of directors. Based on the 
Corporate Governance Survey Report (2006), the smallest numbers of the board 
in Malaysia is three directors and the biggest is fifteen directors with an average 
nine directors in a board. 
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(d) Independent Director 
Independent directors describe as a directors does not hold any executive position 
in the company (MCCG, 2001).  The MCCG (2001) recommends that at least 
one-third of the board should consist of independent directors.  
 
(e) CEO Duality 
CEO duality is a separation of CEO and chairman post in the firm. A separation 
the position is recommend by MCCG (2001) to ensure a balance of power and 
authority. 
 
(f) Institutional Investors 
Institutional investors refers to the top five institutional shareholdings in each 
firm. The institutions are the Employees Provident Fund (EPF), the Lembaga 
Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT), the Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH), the 
Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), and the Social Security Organisation of 
Malaysia (SOCSO).  
 
1.7 Significance of the Study 
 
Results from this study hopefully will be able to explain the relationship between 
corporate governance and cost of equity that will be beneficial not only to the investors 
but also to the firm itself. The impact of corporate governance to the cost of equity are 
very important to the firms’ and also to the investor because they will get better 
information about how well their company or their investment. The level of investor 
confidence will depend on market demand size organisations by using information 
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available in public to make an estimate cost of equity. By using Malaysia as a study, this 
study will be able to see whether there is a relationship that exists between corporate 
governance and cost of equity because the environment and culture in Malaysia is 
different from the environment and culture in other developed countries, because firms in 
Malaysia, mostly owned by the family (Thillainathan, 1999, and Graham et al., 2002). 
This ownership structure is assumed to reduce the cost of equity, but this does not mean 
there is no agency cost problem because there is still a conflict of interest between 
shareholders .  
 
The internal corporate governance variables in which are used in this study are “the size 
of the Board, the level of independent director, and CEO-duality structure”. This study 
also reviews the external variables of corporate governance as institutional investors in 
connection with the cost of equity. Previous research finds that poor corporate 
governance tends to reduce the level of investor confidence (Noordin, 1999). These 
researchers also find that poor corporate governance leads to errors in reporting the 
financial progress (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). 
 
1.8 Organisation of the Remaining Chapters  
 
This study is divided to seven chapters. The first chapter gives an introduction as well as 
an overview of this study. The second chapter presents the institutional background 
covering the development of the capital market and corporate governance in Malaysia. 
The third chapter presents the review of literature that covers points from previous 
studies in lieu to corporate governance and cost of equity. The fourth chapter presents the 
conceptual framework and the hypotheses development.  
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Chapter five illustrates the data and variable in terms of research design, sample 
collection, measurement of variables, and the method of data analysis. Chapter six 
analyzes the results of finding, focusing on statistical analysis, descriptive statistic, 
correlation analysis and multivariate analysis. Lastly, chapter seven presents the 
summary of findings and insinuations of the research are discussed, limitation of the 
study as well as suggestion for future research and concludes this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents an overview of the Malaysian institutional background. Section 2.2 
begins with the background of Malaysian Capital Market development, and section 2.3 
covers on Corporate Governance in Malaysia, and in section 2.4 there will be discussion 
on institutional investor in Malaysia. Finally, Section 2.5 will conclude the end of this 
chapter. 
 
2.2  Malaysian Capital Market  
 
The capital market refers to the market for medium and long term financial assets. The 
capital market includes corporate stock, the government bond market, the market for 
private debt securities, public and private debt securities with maturities exceeding one 
year, and shares with no fixed maturity traded in the stock market. The capital market is 
also known as conducting market debt and equity securities transactions, in which public 
companies and the government to increase their long-term funds. 
 
Since the late 1980s, the capital market in Malaysia has experienced rapid development. 
In 1989, listing of companies from Malaysia and Singapore stock exchanges is an 
important milestone in the development of the Malaysian equity market. In 1993, with 
the proliferation of privatization projects and equity of growth, it has given one of the 
fastest growing markets in the region of Malaysia. In addition, to enable many companies 
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to obtain cheaper financing, equity markets have contributed to the development of the 
private sector, with an initial public offering (IPO) and the issuance of new shares. 
Consequently, the development of equity investment by individual investors, institutions, 
and tourism increase markedly, and market infrastructure has been developed 
accordingly. Regulators, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) and Securities 
Commission (SC), have increased the standards on transparency, disclosure, accounting, 
and corporate governance. In 2004, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) changes 
its name to Bursa Malaysia. 
 
Securities Commission Act 1993 has established the Securities Commission (SC) on 
March 1, 1993. Securities Commission Malaysia (SC) is responsible for regulation and 
development of capital market in Malaysia. The main role of the SC is to act as a 
regulatory body to promote capital market development which is responsible for 
streamlining the securities market regulations, to speed up the processing and approval of 
corporate transactions, to regulate all matters relating to unit trust schemes, and to 
regulate the taking translation, and mergers of companies.1 
 
Beginning of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis has affected the activities of the offshore 
fund-raising by Malaysian companies. Malaysia has a large impact on the performance of 
economic growth and capital markets as a result of this crisis. As a result of critical 
actions by governments and financial regulators, health, economic and capital market 
have not fully recovered. The impact of the Asian financial crisis has not changed, and 
foreign participation in Malaysia's capital market is not fully met. The impact of the crisis 
                                                 
1 The SC is responsible to the Minister of Finance and tables its annual report and account to Parliament. It 
is empowered to investigate breaches of securities regulation, enforce rules and regulation, and prosecute 
securities offences. The Capital Issues Committee (CIC) and Panel on Take-Overs and Merges (TOP) were 
dissolved their functions absorbed by the SC. A number of functions pertaining to the capital markets 
previously undertaken by other authorities were also transferred to the SC gradually over the ensuing years.  
15 
 
posted participants and international investors in the Malaysian capital market to be 
affected.  
 
The banking sector is affected the most because of more loan proceeds, coupled with the 
lack of prudential regulation and supervision. Capital markets, particularly equity 
markets, have an indirect role in increasing the number of bank loans. Banks actively 
raise funds in the equity market, which expands their capital base. With the development 
of capital markets and capital account liberalization, disintermediation combine to some 
extent. However, in the mid-1990s and the role of the offshore bond market is 
insignificant, except for bonds with warrants issued during the equity boom.  
 
Beginning in 1992, the corporate entity has been active in fund tapped the equity market, 
doing IPOs and new share issues to finance the current simple equity boom at that time. 
For some corporate players, the funds raised from capital markets and banks are to 
optimize and grow their financial assets. Even if the explosion took place, they 
successfully build their corporate empires. Unfortunately they have to settle large debts 
from the banking sector and the bond market when it is over. The impact of this 
bankruptcy, non-performing loans (NPLs) of certain banks have been established. In 
addition, stock brokers try to take advantage by providing their customers with credit 
facilities for share trading. However, in July 1997, the share price plunges amid the 
financial crisis and this causes the banking and brokerage stocks to suffer losses as a 
result of a breach of consumer loans, in particular. This is due to capital stock broker that 
is not sufficient to deal with huge losses. As a result, several stock brokers to be in 
trouble and suspended by the KLSE or now known as Bursa Malaysia. In addition, a 
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slow increase in the capital markets has reduced the momentum of capital market 
activities. 
 
Responding to the impact of financial crisis, the Securities Commission introduces the 
Capital Market Masterplan (CMP) to determine the direction of the Malaysian capital 
market for the next ten years which commenced from 2001 to 2010. At first it is 
announced on August 6, 1999 by Second Finance Minister and Chairman of the 
Securities Commission. After that, it is approved by the Minister of Finance in December 
2000 before it is launched in February 2001. CMP goals are developed to set the 
framework for long-term development market and provide clarity for issuers, investors, 
and intermediaries. 
 
The CMP provides a strategic roadmap for the development of capital markets and the 
efficient mobilization and allocation of funds with high confidence for market 
participants to outline the vision by the CMP. In 2001 and 2010, the CMP contains 152 
recommendations are related to the development of the capital market regulation. With 
this 152 recommendations it is covering 11 areas of the equity market, bond market, 
derivatives market, the stock broking industry, market institutions, investment 
management, regulatory framework, corporate governance, capital market, technology 
and e-commerce as well as training and education. However, beginning June 2011, 
according to The Report Malaysia 2011 (as cited by Oxford Business Group, 2011), the 
capital market is transformed with the announcement that Bursa Malaysia will move into 
the FTSE Advanced Emerging Markets Indices. 
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Corporate governance is the tactical central part of the CMP as the Commission 
considers that good corporate governance among public companies listed are important 
to achieve the goal of promoting a more favourable setting for investors in the Malaysian 
capital market. There are ten suggestions to address issues of corporate governance that 
focus on just management of all shareholders and security of shareholder privileges, and 
exposé, including transparency minority rights, board independence, regulatory 
enforcement, corporate ownership, and training and education. Therefore, one suggestion 
proposed by the CMP is the mandatory disclosure on the compliance with the Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance issued in the vamped listing requirements of the 
exchange on January 22, 2001 to listed companies. 
 
Other initiatives related to corporate governance involves the conversion of the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE, now known as Bursa Malaysia) from a jointly owned 
company to a shareholder-owned company, the introduction of the Corporate 
Governance Code, and changes in composition and duty Board of Directors. Disclosure 
rules are also strengthened in 2004. 
 
2.3 Corporate Governance in Malaysia 
 
Discussion on Corporate Governance of Malaysia and other East Asian countries starts 
from the events of East Asian economic collapsed in the second half of 1997. The phase 
places a greater concern and recognition of Corporate Governance to the public and 
private sector in these countries. When foreign investors lose their confidence in 
Thailand and begin to attract resources caused by devaluation of the financial crisis broke 
out properly powered. This problem also causes the nation to switch to other 
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neighbouring countries. The countries that are most affected include Indonesia, Malaysia, 
South Korea and the Philippines. In Malaysia, there are efforts in trying to prevent 
further devaluation, but they lead to a higher level of interest rates and credit contraction. 
The move has resulted in more severe contraction in production and corporate profits are 
reflected in a massive decline in equity. Zulkafli et al. (2005), describes the Kuala 
Lumpur Composite Index declines by 72% during the period from end-June 1997 to the 
end of August 1998. Due to the high interest rates and the real estate market crisis, the 
environment deteriorated markedly. Bank of bodies have been adversely affected because 
most of their loan exposure in the construction and property sectors and stock financing 
the purchase. The 1997/98 Asian financial crisis has shown that the lack of corporate 
governance practices in Malaysia has contributed to the failure of the company (Abdul 
Wahab et al., 2007). Moreover,  Abdul Wahab et al. (2007) find that good corporate 
governance will result in higher firm performance by using the government indexes. 
 
There are different views on the reasons including the economic slowdown, falling 
property and stock markets that cause the financial crisis. However, there are reasons 
more fundamental – the national policy of directed lending, less competition and lack of 
prudential regulations. There are other views to show significant effects of exposure of 
banking institutions on too much debt to cover the economic boom in the early 1990s as 
the source of the crisis. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (1999), the 
crisis affects the domestic policy weaknesses. This is shown by the large current account 
deficit; focus of bank loans in real estate development and financing the purchase of 
shares; weakness in the domestic financial system; poor governance and risk 
management, and too much international borrowing in the corporate sector.  
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As shown by the provisions of the Companies Act 1965 of corporate governance has 
been established in Malaysia for a long time, since 1963. It also adds to the Companies 
Regulations 1966 and the Securities Industry Act 1983. The main source of the reform 
agenda on Corporate Governance in Malaysia is the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance by the Finance Committee. They relate to Corporate Governance, Capital 
Market Master plan (CMP) by the Securities Commission and the Financial Sector 
Master plan (FSMP) by Bank Negara Malaysia in the financial sector. It offers guidelines 
on the principles and best practices in corporate governance and direction for the 
execution and maps the future viewpoints of corporate governance in Malaysia. 
 
In March 2000, the Malaysian Government has set up a committee called the renewal of 
the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG). The basic principles of the 
report focus on key areas such as the board of directors, remuneration of directors, 
shareholders and accountability and audit. MCCG is equal to the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom. This initiative starts with the Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance in 1998 which consists of both government and 
industry. 
 
Abdul Wahab et al. (2008) highlighted the main objective is to promote MCCG 
corporate disclosure by providing investors with accurate and relevant information so 
that better investment decisions can be made. This also can serve as a guide to the board 
of directors of companies to clarify their responsibilities and provide prescriptions to 
strengthen their control. However, Bursa Malaysia plays a major role in reinforcing 
efforts to improve corporate governance practices by implementing the code to the 
Listing Requirements. Through transparency and disclosure requirements, MCCG and 
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Bursa Malaysia have set up their expectations of accountability (Abdul Wahab et al., 
2011) and (Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). Under this approach, companies in 
Malaysia have to apply the general principles of good corporate governance code and 
flexible state of the mind to the different individual companies. 
 
In 2007, MCCG has been revised to improve the Code to strengthen corporate 
governance practices in line with the development of capital markets. The review of the 
effectiveness of the audit committees of public listed companies in which the executive 
director will not be allowed to become members of the audit committee. 
 
2.4 Institutional Investor 
 
Corporate governance also focuses on the rights of minority shareholders. Given the 
Malaysian companies are generally characterized by a dominant shareholder who 
controls the protection of minority shareholders right has become more critical. In 
February 1999, the High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance Report 
Finance Ministry proposed to set the Group Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 
(MSWG) to monitor and protect the rights of the minority shareholders. 
 
There are five public and institutional investors and the largest member of the MSWG is 
established in 2001. The institutions are the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) and the 
Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT) which both are pension funds, Lembaga 
Tabung Haji (LTH), an investment fund [Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB)], and an 
insurance company [Social Security Organisation of Malaysia (SOCSO)]. Their 
shareholdings represent approximately 70 percent of total institutional shareholdings in 
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firms listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia (Abdul Wahab et al., 2008). Among 
the key roles of MSWG is it acts as a platform to launch collective shareholder activism 
that is not ethical, monitors the compliance violations in corporate governance practices, 
and provides training, education and awareness to promote the benefits of shareholder 
activism and the practice of good corporate governance. 
 
EPF and PNB play an important role in improving corporate governance, which has 
become an increasingly important issue in Malaysia. PNB is established to increase the 
Bumiputera shareholding up to 30 percent by 1990. It has a substantial interest in listed 
companies in various sectors of banking, services, manufacturing, trade, transportation, 
construction, conglomerates, mining and farming. 
 
EPF and other institutions related to government investment have also been moving their 
funds to achieve the national target. They are expected to increase Bumiputera’s 
shareholding to 30 percent. Because of this, a small dividend and capital gains through 
the sale of the shares is not expected, given the passive investment policy. However, 
PNB and other public investment entities such as the EPF have invested aggressively in 
equities. Despite the relatively low return on investment (ROI), institutional investors are 
not coming under fire from the public and part of the reason is the book value / cost 
accounting system. However, the objective of increasing Bumiputera shareholding to 30 
per cent does not encourage them to sell shares in the market. Therefore, institutional 
investors can implement their rights to raise one or both of the dividend and the value of 
assets invested in companies with improving corporate governance. 
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2.5 Summary 
 
This chapter highlights the development of Malaysian Capital Market where the 
discussion shows public companies and government raised their long-term funds in 
market transaction securities for debt and equity that are also known as capital market. 
This chapter also relates the economic crisis in 1997 that necessitate for the corporate 
governance efforts on the private sector in the country. The corporate governance in 
Malaysia has been touched to show the impact and effect of corporate governance in 
Malaysia.  The introduction of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) also 
is discussed in this chapter. The main idea of MCCG is to encourage and guide boards of 
directors to strengthen their control. At the end of this chapter, the knowledge about the 
institutional investor in Malaysia has also been discussed. All of the institutional investor 
discussed in the last section is a member of Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group 
(MSWG). 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will present the previous literature on this topic research. Section 3.2 will 
discuss on agency theory, section 3.3 reviews the literature on corporate governance 
while section 3.4 discusses prior research on cost of equity. The summary of this chapter 
will be presented towards the end of this chapter in Section 3.5. 
 
3.2 Agency Theory 
 
In general and current public corporations, there is a notice that the fund providers do not 
have much control over the spending money in their firm that they invested in and have 
limited influence on the firm’s decision-making process. Owners also hand over the 
control to the manager or a professional regulatory authority authorized control over firm 
resources. Therefore, it creates separation of ownership and control leads to a conflict of 
interest between managers and owners (Berle and Means, 1932). When the manager is 
engaged in activities that are inconsistent with the firm’s goal of maximizing shareholder 
wealth, it is a clash of interest between the surfaces. This conflict will ultimately reduce 
the value of the firm. In conclusion, agency theory is commonly viewed as the initial 
point and base for any discussion and research on corporate governance. 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) formally develop the agency costs of outside equity by using 
the theory of modern corporate agency. This is due to the need to establish corporate 
governance for the purpose of reducing agency costs arising from opportunistic 
behaviour of management. They also define the agency relationship as a contract where 
one party (the principal) engages another party (agent) to perform some services on 
behalf of the mother. The principal will delegate some decision-making authority to the 
agent when they manage the firm on their behalf. In the framework of public listed 
companies, the directors are the agents of shareholders, while the shareholders act as the 
principles. Shareholders delegate power to the directors to oversee the management of 
the firm. 
 
According to the agency theory, corporate governance problems or dilemma occur from 
the split ownership and control in corporate organisations. Other than that, it also arises 
from the failure of widespread shareholders and idle debt holders to control the activities 
and behaviour of corporate managers properly and efficiently. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) have interpreted that agents tend to be self-interested, or have their own agenda 
other than to pursue the interests of shareholders and foreign investors. The agents have 
large controls on the functioning of the firm, allotment of resources on behalf of 
shareholders and the controlling information disclosed to the suppliers of capital. Self-
interested intentions encourage managers to switch the assets to activities that affect the 
firm’s objective of maximizing shareholders’ wealth. 
 
 
 
 
